Protocol

Governance

The protocol has no admin keys. Parameter changes go through a stake-weighted vote with a timelock and a documented executor path. Boring is the goal.

Process

Every parameter change follows the same five steps.

Step	Phase	Where it happens	Duration
1	Draft	`gitsea/aips` repo (PR with the AIP template)	Open
2	Temperature check	Off-chain signaling vote on Snapshot	7 days
3	On-chain proposal	`GovernorAsset.propose(...)` on Base	7 days
4	Timelock	48-hour delay before execution	48 hours
5	Execute	Anyone calls `Timelock.execute(proposalId)`	Open

Quorum: 10% of staked supply must vote. Pass threshold: 51% of votes cast. Voting weight: 1× / 5× / 25× by stake tier (see Tokenomics).

What governance can change

Parameters (continuous values):

Stream base rate, sleeper pool percentage, insurance premium bands.
Credit-curve coefficients (α, β, γ, δ, ε).
Staking tier thresholds, slashing penalties.
Fees per action (within hard bounds).

Sets (allowlists / denylists):

Oracle operators per type.
Curator multi-sig members per ecosystem.
Lender-pool tranche definitions.

Logic (constrained):

Upgrade pointers to versioned contract implementations (UUPS pattern).
Add new insurance products via approved factory.

What governance cannot do

The following are outside governance scope and require a hard fork:

Confiscate any wallet's balance.
Censor an individual repo or DID.
Mint $GSEA outside the scheduled 2% inflation.
Move funds from a repo's RepoVault against the maintainer's signed authorization.

These exclusions are encoded in the contracts; a governance proposal that tries to do them will revert.

AIPs (Asset Improvement Proposals)

Every proposal is an AIP — a markdown document in the public gitsea/aips repo. Template:

# AIP-NN: <title>

**Status:** Draft | Temp Check | On-chain | Executed | Rejected
**Author(s):** <DID>
**Created:** YYYY-MM-DD

## Abstract
One paragraph.

## Motivation
The problem this solves.

## Specification
Exact parameter changes or contract pointers.

## Backwards compatibility
What breaks.

## Risk
Tail risks, attack surface.

## Test cases
Unit tests / simulations.

## Rollback
How we revert if it goes wrong.

A proposal cannot reach the on-chain phase without a passing temp check and a complete AIP.

Curators

Curators are domain experts elected by governance to operate the multi-sig oracle for a specific ecosystem (web, ML, infra, etc.). They:

Adjudicate ambiguous insurance claims.
Rule on fork disputes.
Approve PR market resolutions when the deterministic resolver can't decide.

Curator seats are time-boxed (1-year terms), bonded ($GSEA stake), and revocable by emergency vote.

Emergency stop

A short-list of contract addresses can call a 24-hour pause on specific subsystems (not the whole protocol) — typically the lender or insurance pool — when an active exploit is detected.

Composition of the emergency multi-sig is published, rotated yearly, and any pause is automatically reversed unless ratified by a full governance vote within 7 days.

Stake-weighted votes can be delegated to another DID. Delegates are public; their voting history is on chain. Delegation is per-proposal class (e.g., "all credit-curve changes") so you can route the votes you care less about to a trusted policy wonk.

Read-only governance dashboard

Live at app.gitsea.io/gov — open proposals, your voting power, your delegations, your past votes, curator seats, emergency multi-sig composition, scheduled timelocks.

Tokenomics — staking tiers and voting weights.
Smart contracts — GovernorAsset.sol, Timelock.sol.
Security — emergency pause history.